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Cumulative culture, where innovations are progressively incorporated into a  
population’s stock of skills and knowledge, generating ever more sophisticated 
repertoires, is a core aspect of human cognition that underpins the technological 
advances which characterize our species. Cumulative culture relies on our proclivity 
for high fidelity imitation, something that emerged phylogenetically early in our 
evolutionary history and emerges ontogenetically early in our development. 
Commensurate with this proclivity to copy others comes a tradeoff that functionally 
irrelevant behaviors will be easily maintained and transmitted. Rituals are an 
expression of this. In this paper, I set out the argument that the core cognitive 
architecture responsible for cumulative culture and technological progress has the 
same origin as that which propagates rituals: That is, our socially-motivated 




 Over a million years ago our hominin ancestors began constructing the 
complex handaxes and cleavers that characterize the Acheulean stone tool industry. 
The spread of this industry relied on something that is yet to be reliably found in any 
other animal lineage – a focus towards the specific means required to bring about an 
outcome (e.g., the sequence of steps used to produce a symmetrical bifacial handaxe) 
and away from the ultimate goal of the process (e.g., to make a functional butchery 
tool). This approach to social learning signifies the emergence of a fixation on 
behaviors whose overarching purpose is to satisfy social motivations. The primary 
aim in this paper is to outline why this process of high-fidelity imitation, compelled 
by social motivations, is simultaneously responsible for a mind capable of driving 
remarkable technological progress whilst simultaneously engaging in (seemingly) 
functionally-meaningless ritual behaviors.  
 
Cumulative Culture, Imitation and Innovation 
 The kinds of technological advances that impact, enrich and improve our lives 
rely, to varying degrees, on innovations being progressively incorporated into our 
stock of skills and knowledge, ratcheting ever more sophisticated repertoires (1). This 
process is known as cumulative culture. Claims may exist for cumulative culture in 
other animals (e.g., 2) but in terms of complexity and diversity there are no parallels 
to its expression in humans (3).  
For many authors, cumulative culture is  built on our capacities for imitation 
and innovation (see 4). Imitation is key as it permits a vast array of skills and 
behaviors to be transmitted from generation to generation while avoiding the risks and 
potential costs associated with individual learning. From early in life children show a 
capacity for acquiring the skills to operate objects and artifacts by copying what 
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adults do with them. By the time they are 2 years of age children so readily imitate 
that they will reproduce another’s causally irrelevant actions in what has come to be 
known as overimitation (5, 6). For example, Nielsen and Tomaselli (7) had an 
experimenter show children aged 2 to 13 years how to retrieve a toy from a closed 
box (e.g., by pushing open a trap door). Although the box could easily be opened by 
hand, the adult complicated the demonstration by unnecessarily swiping an ordinary 
object across the top of the box in a causally irrelevant manner, then using the same 
object to open the box in an inefficient and difficult way. Children replicated the 
model's object use and incorporated the causally irrelevant actions into their response, 
and, suggesting this is not culturally specific, did so regardless of whether they lived 
in a large, industrialized Western city or in remote Bushman communities of Southern 
Africa.  
Of course, imitation is not enough for cumulative culture to function. There 
needs to be a mechanism for change. There needs to be innovation. However, in stark 
contrast to their capacity for and engagement in imitation, young children appear to 
lack the capacity for independent tool creation and design. Tool innovation, or the 
construction of a novel tool in the absence of observing another perform that 
construction, is a comparatively late developing ability (8). Recent investigations into 
children’s tool innovation reveal that children younger than 7 years struggle to create 
simple tools to achieve a goal if they are given no clues about how the tool could be 
created or what it might look like (9, 10). In a landmark study, children aged 3 to 11 
years were presented with a task in which they needed to retrieve a small bucket 
containing a toy from the bottom of a clear plastic tube (8). To realize the goal, they 
were given a straight pipe cleaner and some distractor items. The solution was to bend 
a hook on one end of the pipe cleaner to fish the bucket out of the tube, something the 
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majority of those younger than 7 years failed to do.  Highlighting the cultural 
broadness of this behavior, young children responded similarly to this task whether 
they grew up in a typical, large Western city or in a small, remote Bushman 
communities (11). It thus appears that when we are young, we are driven imitators but 
restricted innovators.  
 
The Beginnings of Cumulative Culture 
Non-human animals that may be expected to overimitate (domesticated dogs 
and our closest living animal relatives, common chimpanzees and bonobos) do not – 
instead they will omit actions modelled to them that are demonstrably redundant (12-
14). Given the limited evidence for cumulative culture in other animals we can ask 
when, in our evolutionary history, might it have emerged? Answering this question is 
challenging given that minds don't fossilize. Fortunately, the products of them can – 
and it is in this context we can appeal to the archaeological record. Over 2 million 
years ago our Australopithecine and early Homo ancestors were engaged in the 
Oldowan stone tool industry. For most scholars, these early stone tools were primarily 
made through individual trial and error learning, with their shapes largely controlled 
by the properties of the raw materials used (15). That is, the level of engagement in 
social learning necessary to support cumulative culture appears not to have been 
present during this period.  
Around 1.75 million years ago the Oldowan transitioned into the Acheulean, 
the most persistent of all archaeological cultures with its characteristic artefacts, 
handaxes (see Figure 1) and cleavers (16). It has been argued that the hominins who 
produced the Acheulean shared our modern propensity for overimitation (17-19). 
First, many aspects of Acheulean knapping (the deliberate shaping of stone to make 
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tools) make it unlikely that the propagation of these tools was achieved via processes 
of independent invention. For example, their manufacture employs a series of 
hierarchically organized stages arranged in sequences such that the relationship 
between execution of the earlier stages and the finished product would be 
imperceptible to a novice (20). Another key feature is the unparalleled homogeneity 
of the Acheulean: the industry persisted for around 1.5 million years (16, 21) and 
spread as far afield as South Africa and North Wales, and from Morocco to Nepal. 
The Acheulean even transcends species boundaries, being manufactured by various 
hominins, including Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis. Critically, the 
symmetry and size of handaxes have been shown to be more homogenous than would 
be expected under conditions of random variation, indicating cultural constraints on 
these factors (22, 23). Finally, Acheulean bifaces are deliberately shaped to be 
symmetrical, often in two planes (see Fig 1), yet butchery experiments suggest this 
symmetry does not greatly improve their utilitarian value (24). Manufacture of these 
objects was thus maintained across multiple generations as an outcome of 
overimitation of an approximately, but unnecessarily, symmetrical form. 
Existing from around 1.75mya to around 800kya, the unparalleled longevity 
and ubiquity of the Acheulean thus appears dependent on a mind that left much 
evidence of high fidelity imitation but little of innovation (21). Indeed, it is not until 
we move into the Middle Paleolithic, around 300 kya, that clear signs of functional 
innovative approaches to stone tool manufacture emerge in what is known as the 
Mousterian tool kit (commonly associated with Homo neanderthalensis, late archaic 
humans, and anatomically modern humans) featuring tools specially made for 
skinning and preparing meat, hunting, and woodworking (for speculation over what 
might have driven the shift from the Acheulean to the Mousterian see 17).  
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There is thus a vast evolutionary pressure shaping our cumulative cultural 
mind: Pressure exerted relatively early in our Homo phylogeny that builds imitation 
and resists innovation. But what do stone tools have to do with ritual? Key here is that 
in the construction of Acheulean stone tools we see signs of the devotion to high 
fidelity imitation which emerges early in modern children and is thought to underpin 
cumulative culture and by extension new technology. Critically, through reliance on 
this process, Acheulean stone tools also hint at the emergence of ritual behavior.  
 
Overimitation and Ritual  
Almost all human societies feature rituals: conventional, causally opaque 
procedures, that are uninterpretable from the perspective of physical causality because 
they lack an intuitive or observable causal connection between the specific action 
performed (e.g., synchronized dancing) and the desired outcome or effect (e.g., 
making it rain) (25). Consider births, deaths, marriages or any other significant 
cultural milestone experienced through the lifespan and try to imagine how they 
would appear without ritual of some form at their center.  
Rituals tend to feature actions that are both causally opaque, affording no 
access to a physical causal mechanism, and goal demoted, affording little-to-no 
insight into the motives of the ritual actor (see 26, 27). Ritualized actions cannot 
therefore be interpreted as serving an exclusively instrumental purpose but are instead 
interpreted as being motivated by social concerns, such as affiliation with group 
members or group-relevant norms (28). There are multiple ways in which children 
show social and cognitive preparedness to adopt the ritualized behaviors of those 
around them (4, 28). According to a number of authors the most compelling is 
overimitation (18, 29, 30).  
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A key feature that overimitation shares with rituals is the focus on the actions 
used over the outcomes achieved. Highlighting this, in a study by Nielsen and 
colleagues (30), preschool children watched an adult experimenter model redundant 
actions on a box (e.g., tapping the side of it with a tool) after the box had been 
opened. When given the box and tool, children reproduced the redundant action 
despite there being no causal value in doing so (the box was open at the time the 
actions were produced and the toy that had been hidden inside was accessible). 
Extending this design, young children living in remote Bushman communities in 
South Africa were shown a sequence of causally irrelevant actions on an opaque box 
(31). For some of the children the actions culminated in a clear goal being achieved 
(i.e., a desirable sticker was retrieved), for others the goal was made unclear (e.g., the 
sticker was available but not retrieved) or removed entirely (i.e., there was nothing in 
the box – the actions did not achieve anything). The children consistently replicated 
the causally irrelevant actions, but when there was no goal at all the irrelevant actions 
were reproduced at significantly higher rates and featured considerable additional 
repetition, redundancy, and stereotypy. Thus, when the actions were most ritualistic 
and least instrumental children reproduced them with the greatest number of 
repetitions. This highlights the ease with which children overimitate but also how this 




There is ample evidence that overimitation functions to satisfy social 
motivations, be they affiliative or normative (see 32). For example, Nielsen and Blank 
(33) had 4 to 5 year old children sit opposite two adult models. Both experimenters 
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took turns demonstrating a sequence of actions on a puzzle box that led to it being 
opened, making a novel toy available for retrieval. One of the models included 
irrelevant actions in her demonstration whereas the other used only causally relevant 
actions. When the child was given the box to operate on, one of the adults left the test 
room. The children proceeded to copy the actions of whomever remained – most 
tellingly reproducing the irrelevant actions when the model who had used them was 
still sitting opposite, despite the alternate adult having clearly shown these actions 
were unnecessary. Other studies have shown that children will actively protest a 
protagonist omitting a causally irrelevant action after having seen it being modeled, 
and will do so even after stating that they understand the irrelevant action is not 
necessary to achieving the modeled goal (see 34, 35). In line with this, contemporary 
experimental archaeology studies have highlighted the likely role of social 
motivations in handaxe construction (see 36).  
There is thus evidence for the early emergence, ontogenetically and 
phylogenetically, of behavior underpinned by social motivations and that these 
motivations guide (and guided) learning and skill acquisition decisions. Whether to 
satisfy affiliative or normative concerns, once social reasons are used to drive 
decisions about what to learn ritual behavior can easily take hold. Notably, this 
psychological foundation of a simultaneously technological and ritual mind may 
mean that arguments about science displacing religious belief will ultimately prove 
false  
A Speculative Link Between Science and Religion 
Science may be idealized as a process in which theories or paradigms are 
evaluated according to a set of values, with the strength of the resulting evidence 
subjected to test and subsequent peer evaluation. No matter how novel, discoveries in 
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science build off of an ever-increasing corpus of skill and knowledge that no single 
individual could develop in his or her lifetime (whether ideas themselves or reliance 
on previously developed apparatus and/or techniques). In this regard, science can be 
seen as an expression of cumulative culture. Reflecting this, a number of authors draw 
developmental links between imitation and children’s scientific reasoning (e.g., 37, 
38). Critically, attention has also been drawn to links between imitation and children’s 
understanding of rituals (e.g., 39, 40). While non-religious rituals exist (e.g., singing 
‘happy birthday’) the most diverse and elaborate ones are found among religious 
groups (41). Indeed, our engagement with rituals in terms of our compulsion to enact 
them is one reason religions are so pervasive and transmissible (42). 
 Multiple reasons have been proposed to explain why religions have such a 
hold on our psychology. Irrespective of the reasons, for over a century there have 
been predictions that an increasing reliance on, and understanding of, scientific 
frameworks will ultimately result in the disappearance of religion (e.g., 43). However, 
to the extent that science is an expression of cumulative culture, and religion is 
grounded in ritual behavior, such views may prove ultimately invalid given both 
processes rely on the same cognitive architecture: A socially-motivated imitative 
mind. That is, irrespective of our capacity to explain more and more of our world by 
relying on some version of a scientific method ideas appealing to supernatural and 
untestable approaches have not completely disappeared. It may be this way precisely 
because the mind, driven as it is by social motivations and shaped to copy everything 
others do, enables science while simultaneously enabling religion. New research 




Over a million years ago our ancestors began to manufacture artifacts for 
reasons that transcended pure functionality and likely satisfied social motivations. 
This characterized the emergence of a devotion to high fidelity imitation and with it 
the beginnings of cumulative culture. This same mind became fertile ground for 
planting ritual behaviors. Thus, in both of its primary components (i.e., the technical 
side whereby skills and behaviors are rapidly learned through a focus on process and 
the precise actions used, rather than the outcome achieved) and motivations (i.e., the 
normative/affiliative side whereby actions will be reproduced even when their causal 
efficacy is suspect) overimitation provides the bedrock on which cumulative culture 
and ritual are built in a single unifying package. The last decade has seen an ever-
growing corpus of research devoted to understanding overimitation (for an exhaustive 
list see Table S1 in 44). As is hopefully evident here, such research promises to not 
only yield novel insights into the mind of the developing child but to also provide 
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Figure 1. Bifacial handaxes made in the Acheulean tradition. LHS images show a tool 
made by an experienced knapper highlighting how these artifacts are commonly 
shaped to be symmetrical in two planes. Underscoring the challenging nature of their 
construction, RHS images show the best of many attempts by the author under direct, 
guided instruction from the expert. For a detailed analysis of Acheulean construction 
techniques see Muller, Clarkson and Shipton (25).  
 
 
 
